issues relevant to state regulation of private schools. Much of the authority to develop educational systems has been left to the states. Constitutional principles are created when specific statutes, regulations, or policies are challenged.
The first principle that seems to me of grave importance is that education in the abstract is not a child's fundamental right.i Yet once a public school has been established, the child's right to access to that institution cannot be denied. Segregation of children by race does violate the United States Constitution.2 The United States Supreme Court, in deciding Brown v. Board of Education, said that "today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments."^ The Court has also ruled that states may not exclude children of illegal aliens from public schools.* Thus, the Court has emphasized the overwhelming importance of education for a child in this nation.^ Where states have established a public school, the right of access to education is so crucial that it rises to the level of a property or liberty interest of such magnitude that a child cannot be suspended from public school for as much as ten days without "some kind of hearing" under the due process clause.* Whereas education for the child is not a fundamental right, parents do have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of children under their control, including a right to send children to a private or parochial school should they so prefer.'' In con- trast, a constitutional right to educate children at home does not exist.^ Parental rights are not absolute. ' On issues affecting separation of church and state arising from the First Amendment to the federal Constitution, school prayer and the posting of the Ten Commandments in public schools violate the establishment clause.'" Covernment aid to parochial schools, including aid for parochial school teachers and instruction by public school teachers in a parochial school, has also been determined to violate the establishment clause." On the other hand, aid to the parent or child for transportation or secular textbooks does not.'Ŝ tates may not prohibit the teaching of foreign language in public schools, a notion that seems archaic now.'^ If states receive federal aid for special education, a child in need of special education is entitled to a "free appropriate education," and that right carries with it a host of procedural protections.^Â ll fifty states do have public school systems even though the United States Constitution does not require them. Laws and 8. In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that "the State's interest in assuring that these standards are being met has been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept instruction at home as compliance with compulsory education statutes." Ibid, at 246 regulations creating those public school systems are varied. ^Î mplied by the title of this article is the notion of regulation of private schools by the state. The truth is that the extent of the regulation of private schools in the fifty states also varies accordingly. Regulation varies from none at all to substantial.
WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE and what does the Constitution permit or prohibit when states regulate the operation of private schools? Those constitutional issues are closely related to the operation of compulsory attendance laws. Therefore, attention to the development of compulsory education is necessary before we can examine the constitutional issues that have arisen in Iowa.
The first compulsory attendance law in the United States was adopted by Massachusetts in 1852, though a public school system had existed in Massachusetts as early as 1671.^* The Iowa Supreme Court recognized the reasons for such a compulsory education law in 1871 in Burdick v. Babcock. There the court observed that the object of schools is "to secure education to the children of the State."^^ Compulsory education laws were recognized as benefiting children as part of the general welfare of society. Burdick came long before the Iowa compulsory education law, child labor laws, special education laws, and the host of other protective legislation governing the rights and welfare of children. ^^ The children in Burdick had been expelled under school rules for excessive absences. At that time parents claimed that they were entitled to the services of their children. In other words, children had the status of chattel. In upholding the school rules, the court said, "If the education of children were compulsory upon parents, who could be reached by proper penalties, as for an offense for failure to send their chil- dren to school, in that case the child could be relieved from the hardship of expulsion, and the parent made responsible for his acts in detaining him from school."^T he first compulsory attendance bill was introduced in the Iowa legislature in 1872, the year after Burdick v. Babcock was decided by the Iowa Supreme Court. But Iowa did not enact such a law until 1902, when it became the thirty-third state to adopt such legislation.^" The 1902 statute was a simple one, but it contained the essential features that still exist in current law. Parents were required to cause children, age 7 to 14, with some exceptions, to attend a public, private, or parochial school for a given number of days per year. As an alternative, a child could "attend upon equivalent instruction by a competent teacher elsewhere than [in a] school." The bill also specified the courses to be taught: reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, grammar, geography, physiology, and United States history.^V iolation of the statute was to be a misdemeanor, and conviction could result in a fine of not less than three dollars nor more than twenty doUars.^^ Penalties for violating the law were imposed on parents, not on private or parochial schools. Principals of private and parochial schools and parents who educated children "privately" were asked to report to the school district the names, ages, and attendance of their pupils, but failure to report was not yet designated as a crime. Public school officials. (1985) . That law permits home instruction, subject to extensive regulation. Violation of the compulsory education law is a misdemeanor. Parents may also be subject to laws having to do with children "in need of services." Ibid., § 22. 1-262. on the other hand, were mandated to enforce the law; if they failed to do so, they were liable for a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than twenty dollars for each offense. Public school officials were also obliged to take a census, to determine the number of children who did not attend school, and, if possible, to determine the cause of truancy. ^B etween 1902 and 1924 some changes were made. In 1904 coverage was expanded to include children to age 16 or until completion of the eighth grade, and in 1909 the number of days of attendance was increased to 120.^'' In 1924, following amendments to the law, the code editor moved the list of subjects to be taught from the compulsory attendance chapter and placed it in a code chapter entitled Courses of Study. In 1931 the history of Iowa was added to the list of required courses. ^T here is a gap in available information about compulsory education cases in Iowa's trial courts. However, historian Carroll Engelhardt has reviewed school statistics gathered and reported by the state superintendent and concluded that "despite spotty enforcement during its early years, the new law did produce increased attendance." After 1932 the number of non-attenders was no longer reported in the school statistics by the state department.^* We simply do not know how many parents were convicted for violations. State trial court rulings are neither published nor granted precedential value. Misdemeanors were tried by justices of the peace in townships, in mayors' courts, and in other lower courts. A unified court system and the collection of court statistics came later.^T here is no doubt, however, that most children in Iowa attended school. The quality of education may have varied. guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.'^* Thus Pierce stands for the principle that parents have a fundamental right or liberty to enroll children in a private school and cannot be compelled to send them to a public school.^5 But Pierce and Meyer also affirmed the power of states to adopt reasonable regulations to require that children of proper age attend school, that private schools teach certain subjects, and that states may regulate those who teach.^^ Succinctly put: children may attend private schools, but states may impose reasonable regulations on those schools. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court said, "A state always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standards in all schools it allows to operate."^T HE PHRASE IN THE TITLE "the nature of the wall" refers to a metaphor from Thomas Jefferson, who once described "a wall of separation between church and state.'^s The United States Supreme Court has used the metaphor, but justices have expressed some dissatisfaction with it. Justice Burger wrote, "Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.'^' The wall-of-separation metaphor and the term freedom of religion oversimplify the two religious clauses of the First Amendment. Cases or issues asserted under the establishment clause require an analysis that is quite different from the analysis in free exercise disputes. In Reynolds, the case in which a law prohibiting polygamy was upheld, the court said, "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. 39. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman the United States Supreme Court enunciated the test to be used in deciding establishment clause cases as follows: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; ... finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"'"' The vitality of that test has been reaffirmed repeatedly in the years since Lemon was decided.'*T he applicable analysis in free exercise cases is more complex. The preliminary framework was set out in Sherbert v. Verner (1963) , which provided a two-pronged analysis. First, does application of the statute constitute an infringement upon the individual's religious liberty? (Both direct and indirect burdens may be considered.) Second, is the burden imposed by challenged statutes justified by a compelling state interest?"T he Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, expanded the first prong of Sherbert to inquire whether the religious activity at issue was motivated by and rooted in a sincerely held religious belief that is central to the religion.''^ The centrality aspect of the Yoder analysis requires a determination of fact.'''' The next step in the analysis of whether a burden exists is an issue of law.*^ If a burden is cast on the central beliefs by regulations, then the state must show it has a compelling interest in the purpose the regulations seek to accomplish. If a court determines that a sincere, deeply rooted religious belief is at stake in conduct that is regulated pursuant to a compelling state interest, the court then engages in a balancing process. The purpose of the balancing process is to determine whether the burden imposed is justified by the compelling state interest.*^ In cases in which a court has found that a compelling state interest is not at stake, the regulation falls with ease.*'' If the court determines that the compelling state interest outweighs the burden on religious belief or activity, the religious belief must give way.*^ If the court finds, as a matter of law, that the burden on religious belief outweighs the compelling state interest, the court then determines whether the compelling state interest can be met in a less drastic way, that is, by other means.*^ In Yoder, the Court decided that the compelling interest of the state in requiring attendance beyond eighth grade was overcome by Amish religious beliefs and practices. Moreover, the interests of the state in the education of the children were met by the Amish through their own vocational education in their isolated farming community.5°I n summary, the test is (1) whether the religious belief asserted to be infringed is central; (2) whether such an interest is burdened; (3) whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest that outweighs the burden on religion; and, if plaintiffs prevail on the first three prongs, (4) whether a less drastic means is available to serve the compelling state interest.5^ Other constitutional issues arise in connection with regulation of private or church schools and require other analytical approaches.52 Further, cases pertaining to statutes that accommodate religious organizations or the conduct of individuals require additional analytical concepts.^Î t is not a wall between church and state; it is a great thorny thicket. The Court has said, "Our prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is 47 As one who grew up in an area heavily populated by Amish and Mennonites and who attended school with Amish and Mennonite children, the Amish controversy in Iowa was puzzling. My role as a lawyer in the recent cases related to the controversy is an aspect of my life that I can only regard as ironic. I was neither Amish nor Mennonite and so I was different, with all the results that descend on a child who is different-name calling, physical abuse, and all the rest. Most of the teachers in grade school were Mennonite. The women teachers wore "coverings." Further, the superintendent-teacher of the two-teacher high school. Center High School, Washington Township, Johnson County, was Mennonite during my high school years. 60. See Iowa Code § § 1766-69 (1873) for the statute authorizing examination of applicants and issuance of teacher certificates by the county superintendent. Iowa Code § 1771 (1873) permitted a county superintendent to revoke a certificate after an investigation, notice to the teacher, and an opportunity for the teacher to be present and make a defense.
areas.*' Therefore, the Mennonite farmers were the school board members in those rural districts in which they lived. Given the historical fact that public school teachers in Amish communities held certificates, the commentary that attributes most of the Amish controversy to their strong objections to state-certified teachers is subject to doubt.^^ Rather, the background of legislative change in 1967 led to the religious exemption from the Iowa compulsory education law which came to be known as the Amish exemption."
Pressure to improve schools was strong after World War II. In 1953 drastic changes were enacted.^ Selection of the state superintendent changed from a partisan election to appointment by the state board. The process for selecting the state board also changed. The superintendent was directed to promulgate minimum standards, including the subjects that were required to be taught. The superintendent also was directed to formulate an approval process for public schools. Private schools could seek approval, but such approval was not required and is not required now.^^ The teacher certification process changed as well.^^ Educational qualifications for teach- (1987) , which requires a principal of a private school to file reports. Nonpublic schools may seek approval or accreditation, but, except for the sanction of removal from the list of accredited schools, there is no penalty for schools that are not approved. In contrast, a public school district that fails to meet accreditation standards will be merged with another district. Iowa Code § 256.11(12). ers increased.^^ Moreover, the reference to private schools was deleted from the first paragraph of section 299.1 of the Iowa Code, leaving the requirement that children attend public school. The alternative for parents in the statute referred to all education that was not in public school. Thus the statute met the Pierce principle that parents cannot be required to send children to public school. The term competent teacher was changed to certified teacher.^Ô ther great changes flowed from those contained in the reorganization law of 1953. The legislature declared that it was the policy of the state to encourage reorganization. In 1957 the statement of policy became a mandate that all areas of the state be in a high school district by July 1, 1962. The one-room school was disappearing. In 1965 the deadline for reorganization was moved up to July 1, 1966.*^ Thus, the one-room Iowa public school became extinct about fifteen years after the passage of the reorganization law of 1953.
It was in that post-1953 era that the Amish resisted school laws, particularly in the Hazleton-Oelwein area when reorganization efforts began there.^'' A Des Moines Register photographer won a Pulitzer Prize for a posed picture of Amish children scattering into corn fields to avoid a school bus.''^ That picture has become part of a great Iowa myth, using the word myth properly as symbolic truth. It was a great media event.
During the months that it took for a blue-ribbon committee to propose a bill and for the General Assembly to act, the Amish children in the Hazleton area attended a private school 67 taught by certified teachers who were paid by funds provided by The Danforth Foundation of St. Louis.''^ In my view, the Iowa Amish objected to children being transported to town and school, away from the community, and to the exposure to worldly influences.^T he Amish exemption was adopted before a similar controversy was resolved in Wisconsin. There, the Amish objected to a Wisconsin requirement that children attend school until age 16, which usually meant two years of high school.^'' Iowa law required, then as now, only that a child complete eighth grade, or reach the age of 16, whichever happened first. ^^ The Wisconsin children had completed eighth grade in public school.''* Thus, Wisconsin v. Yoder is not a case in which regulation of private schools was at stake. Instruction of Amish children by certified teachers was not an issue either. The court in Yoder expanded the analysis that is used by the courts when plaintiffs contend that free exercise of religion is violated.^'' The result of Yoder was a judicial exemption from attending high school for Amish.78 ¡^ keeping with the Court's conclusion that few other groups could make the required showing, the outcome in other cases is usually different from Yoder.''Î n Iowa in 1986-87, 520 children attended twenty-nine Amish and conservative Mennonite schools. Twenty-four of the twenty-nine schools were "Old Order" or "house Amish. Iowa's compulsory attendance law.^^ Bills to amend the law have been introduced repeatedly. Vigorous lobbying efforts by fundamentalist groups and those who wish to educate children at home failed until 1988 to produce statutory changes. The Iowa efforts are a part of a nationwide wave of challenges, often in cases with the same lawyers, the same witnesses, the same pleadings, the same issues.^* The first Iowa case. State v. Moorhead (1981) , established that if a child of compulsory school age was not in public school, it is an affirmative defense for the parent to show at trial that the child was "receiving equivalent instruction by a certified teacher elsewhere." The court also said that section 299.1 of the Iowa Code was not vague, citing the educational standards section which lists the subjects that are required to be taught in Iowa public schools.^T he Charles City litigation followed. The parties stipulated the issues to be decided, at least fifty-eight issues, which the district court meticulously ruled on in an eighty-page order. The issues included definition of the term school, freedom of association and assembly, right of privacy, right to direct the education and upbringing of a child, self-incrimination, free exercise, establishment clause, overbreadth, vagueness, equal protection, and undue delegation. In addition, numerous statutory construction problems were considered. The trial took nine days in the fall of 1982. The judicial review of denial of the religious exemption by the State Board of Education was decided separately but in the same order as the other issues of the declaratory judgment action. The district court rejected each challenge to Iowa law.»^ An appeal followed but not on all the issues decided by the district court. , acknowledged Iowa's long tradition of friendly coexistence between private and public schools. It cited Pierce and other cases for the notion that the state has not only the authority but also the duty to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education.^^ That decision was consistent with dozens of other cases that have been decided by courts in Nebraska, North Dakota, Michigan, and many other states. Such cases have upheld the requirement that children be taught by certified teachers. Until recently, few challenges have addressed specific requirements regarding the subject matter to be taught; most recent cases have been challenges to any regulation of private schools.^* The Iowa court interpreted the religious exemption narrowly in denying the plaintiffs' right to exemption from the compulsory attendance law. Unlike the Amish, who live in a separate agrarian society, the court found that the plaintiff's children would "live, compete for jobs, work, and move about in a diverse and complex society."^' The United States Supreme Court refused to hear the application for review of the denial of the so-called Amish exemption.^°W hile the Charles City case worked its way through the state courts, another case. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, was pending in the federal district court. It was brought by an association of twenty-two schools. By trial time, the named plaintiffs were two churches, pastors, instructors, parents, and children. The case was tried in September 1985, after the Iowa Supreme Court had decided Charles City. In most respects, the twelve-day trial was a rerun of the Charles City case, as Judge
William C. Stuart indicated in his decision. There were, however, three notable distinctions. First, the court found that the term equivalent instruction was unconstitutionally vague "without further definition." Second, statistical evidence was introduced concerning the results of investigations of child abuse. The legislature that spring had amended the statute to include teachers as mandatory child abuse reporters. The evidence showed that except for law enforcement personnel, certified school personnel have the highest percentage of "founded child abuse reports." Thus, a health and safety component was added to the compelling interest of the state in requiring children to be taught by certified teachers. Further, the importance of certified teachers as a means to identify children in need of special education was added to the list of interests served by the law.'' The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; a cross appeal of the vagueness holding was filed; and the Keokuk school district cross appealed the denial of attorney fees. At the time of briefing and oral argument to the circuit court, the new department of education rules on equivalent instruction had taken effect.'^ The state and the school district argued that Judge Stuart's vagueness ruling was moot. In a very strongly worded decision, the circuit court affirmed the district court decision except that the denial of attorney fees was reversed and remanded. Cranting of attorney fees to defendants is not a frequent occurrence, but the Eighth Circuit described the case against the Keokuk school district as "vexatious and unreasonable." The case was also remanded for a determination as to whether the new departmental rules had cured the vagueness of the statute.^9 Judge Stuart's decision on remand echoed the PierceMeyer-Yoder doctrine. He ruled that the new regulations avoided the constitutional prohibition against vagueness but were not so extensive that the free exercise of religion was unduly burdened. The court found that "the new standards provide sufficient notice to private schools of how to comply with the minimum regulations and provide sufficiently explicit standards for those who enforce it."'* Thus the Iowa law, as further defined by departmental rules, has passed all the constitutional tests that have been presented.^Â n Iowa Supreme Court decision. State v. Trucke (1987) , complicated the Iowa picture. During the period between the ruling that "equivalent education" was vague and the effective date of the new rules, Greg and Karen Trucke were convicted for failing to have their children taught by a certified teacher. A divided court ruled that the parents had not yet committed a crime and dismissed the charges. The decision meant that parents could not be prosecuted until the point was reached in a school year when children could not still be provided with 120 days of education. Put another way, parents could not be prosecuted under the Trucke ruling until after March 11,1988, for the 1987-88 school year. This conclusion is based on the court's statement that "excluding weekends and holidays, the Tnickes still had approximately 220 days left in the year to comply with the statute." In an exceptionally vigorous dissent, three justices said, "The compulsory education law is thus completely gutted." Trucke, however, was not a constitutional case; it was based on omission of an essential element of the crime from the charging instrument.^Ŵ hat, then, is the existing reality with respect to compulsory attendance law in Iowa? The Iowa compulsory education law has been upheld against constitutional attacks, the one defect having been cured by rules. A statutory inter- pretation increased the pressure on the legislature to amend the Iowa law.
The school census statute, a statute that preceded the attendance law, was repealed in 1986.'^ In repealing the school census statute requirement, the General Assembly did not delete the reference to the school census in the compulsory education law. Until 1931 the school census was taken annually; thereafter it was required every other year.^^ The school census had served two purposes since 1902: it facilitated planning, and it served as a tool for a school district to carry out its mandated responsibility to enforce the compulsory education law. A school district official could compare the school census list with the list of students enrolled in the public school and the list of students in reports received from private schools. From that comparison, it could be determined what children were not attending school as the first step in identifying children who were "apparently truant," and whose parents might be subject to prosecution.^^ The 1988 session of the legislature deleted the reference to the school census in the Iowa Code. Subsequently, school officers "shall ascertain the number of children over seven and under sixteen years of age, in their respective districts, the number of such children who do not attend school, and so far as possible the cause of the failure to attend." However, no mechanism is provided for implementing the duty to "ascertain" the number of such children.i°°W ithout a school census the capability to identify all children in the district does not exist.i°^ Admittedly, a biennial census becomes outdated, although it is better than nothing. There are concerns lurking in the background: How do school districts 97. 1986 plan? How do they project future enrollment? How do they enforce compulsory education? How can the State of Iowa meet its contractual obligations with the federal government to provide special education for all children in need of a "free appropriate special education"?^''^ What about future lawsuits by children, when they reach majority, based on the failure of the school district to see that the child has been provided with education, a liberty and property interest?'°T he church schools in Charles City, Keokuk, and Marshalltown that lost the cases discussed above continue to operate. "Homeschooler" organizations claim that hundreds of families in Iowa are educating children at home. No one knows how many Iowa children are not receiving education of any kind. No one knows how many children receive only marginal education. Improved standards for public schools are adopted.^"* Higher pay is granted teachers.^°^ But the benefits of those changes are for the children whose parents cause them to attend public school or approved private schools.
Since Yoder was decided, the United States Supreme Court has refused to hear dozens of cases that challenge state compulsory education laws, including laws that are stricter than Iowa's. As before, the required period of attendance for children of compulsory school age was at least 120 days each school year; the amendment provided that the "requirement shall be met by attending for at least thirty days each school quarter, or a similar distribution of attendance throughout the school year." The reporting requirements for parents who place a child under "private instruction" were expanded to include an outline of the course of study, including weekly lesson plans, tests used, the name and address of the instructor, and time spent on the different areas of curriculum. The penalty for violation of the law was reduced to "not more than forty hours of unpaid community service instead of any fine or imprisonment." Prosecutions of violators were deferred "until after July 1, 1989 , unless the parent, guardian, or custodian fails to meet the requirements of secavailable process for taking action against parents who do not send their children to school. The court ruled, in the case. In the Interest ofB.B. v. the State of Iowa, No. 88-1348 (Iowa 1989 , that a child was in need of assistance because the parents had failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising the child as provided by Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (1987) . That section appears in the chapter of the Iowa Code that is commonly known as the CHINA law. The child, who had been identified as a child in need of special education, had been kept home from school for most of three years. The parents claimed illness, but the court found no medical evidence that would support such an extended absence, and the parents had not sought a health exemption as provided by law. The case is important for a number of reasons, including the identification of education as a factor to be considered in determining what is in the best interest of a child. Further, CHINA is not a criminal statute, so the court may construct a variety of remedies that range up to removing a child from the custody of parents. What impact the new decision will have on the efforts of school officials to make certain that children of compulsory school age will attend school is difficult to predict. It is clear, however, that the decision marks a major change in Iowa law. tion 299.4" (the reporting requirements outlined above; emphasis added). Finally, the Iowa legislative council was requested to establish an interim study committee to conduct a comprehensive study of the existing compulsory education law and to develop recommendations to submit to the 1989 General Assembly. The legislation was publicized generally as a "moratorium" on all enforcement of the compulsory education law even though it was not a total ban on prosecutions.^"T he partial moratorium expired July 1, 1989. The 1989 General Assembly did not further amend the compulsory education law. Given the policy that requires strict construction of criminal statutes, the 1988 amendments may have created new problems, aside from the temporary and partially deferred prosecutions.^''^ For example, the language in the law that parents "shall cause the child to attend," was changed to "shall enroll the child in some public school.""" That change in the law may produce an issue of whether it is the child rather than the parent who is subject to prosecution. It is clear that consideration of compulsory education law is not over in Iowa.
